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Down South, up North: party strategy and performances of the Extreme Right in 
municipal office in France 
 
 
Gilles Ivaldi * 
University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to assess the French Front national’s performances in municipal office following its success in 
securing a majority in four city councils in the mid-1990s. First, a brief account of the local political opportunity 
structures that participated in the municipal success of the FN is provided. The paper then suggests a 
characterisation of two divergent models of policy and vote-seeking styles of municipal governance whilst 
pointing at the commonality in the classic far right agenda underpinning social and cultural policies across the 
four localities under FN administration. As will be discussed, this strong authoritarian tropism translated into 
sectoral re-allocation of council financial resources and the targeting of the party's traditional constituency at 
local level. The building of an electoral clientele paved the way to the development of political corruption and 
municipal nepotism, which in most cases would later account for the rejection of incumbent FN mayors by 
voters. Wherever possible, the above framework for analysis is applied to exploring the strategic attempts by the 
extreme right to get hold of the Northern city of Hénin-Beaumont in the recent 2008 and 2009 municipal 
elections. The emphasis is on how a more pragmatic line of political communication was again replicated in 
combination with the populist anti-tax and anti-corruption agenda that had already contributed to the municipal 
rise of the party in the South in the mid-1990s. 
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“I would never vote FN in a presidential election, that would be too 
dangerous. But in the municipals, it’s not the same. Briois is well 
known here and even if we wanted to, I don’t think he would have 
the power to throw foreigners out” (voter in Hénin-Beaumont, July 
2009). 
 
“Stop it with the FN! Bompard has been in post for six years and we 
haven’t seen any concentration camp” (voter in Orange, March 
2001). 
 
 
 
 
Over the past few decades, right-wing populist and populist radical right parties have 
succeeded in establishing themselves as key competitors across Europe. The electoral 
consolidation, increased legislative weight and systemic integration of those parties have 
paved the way to their entering government at local, regional and national level. The 
emergence of this pattern of 'populist incumbency' has in return prompted a number of 
questions which form the bulk of a new research agenda on populists in public office and, 
perhaps more generally, the issue of those parties' position across the integration / exclusion 
spectrum. The wide range of national experiences of accommodating populist parties in 
government illustrate the complexity of political and party system factors behind the 
dynamics of strategic co-operation, coalition bargaining and policy making (see for instance 
Gallagher, 2000; Minkenberg, 2001; Bale, 2003; Heinisch, 2003; Luther, 2003; Delwit and 
Poirier, 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). 
 
This paper offers to reflect more specifically on the experience of the French Front national 
(FN) holding municipal power in the mid-1990s. The party’s success in securing four city 
councils of Southern France in 1995 (Toulon, Marignane and Orange) and 1997 (Vitrolles) 
was the first occurrence of the extreme right in public office since the fall of collaborationist 
Vichy regime1. In line with the emerging comparative literature on populist parties in office, 
the analysis of this period of the Front national assuming local power raises a number of 
issues regarding patterns of management and policy-making by the far right at municipal 
level, as well as some of the most relevant features of the local political scene in France. 
 
To begin, the paper provides an outline of the political opportunity structures that existed at 
local level, which largely facilitated the accommodation of the far right by the RPR/UDF 
cartel over the 1986-1998 period, and later participated in the municipal success of the FN. 
Beside the electoral weight of the party in those particular localities, the emphasis is placed on 
the ideological proximity and organisational ‘porosity’ between the mainstream and the 
extreme right, the specific sociology of the FN constituency in Southern France as well as the 
electoral appeal of a ‘winning formula’ combining anti-tax demagoguery with traditional anti-
establishment politics. An interesting comparison can be drawn here with the political 
conditions that have prevailed in the rise of the FN in Hénin-Beaumont and more generally in 
the consolidation of the party in the North-East part of the country since 2002. 
                                                 
1
 Notwithstanding the short-lived experience of FN-led local administration of the city of Saint-Gilles (Gard, 
12,000 inhab.) following the party’s success in the 1989 local elections. The joint FN/RPR list led by Charles de 
Chambrun won a 3-party ballot by a narrow 39.5 per cent of the votes in the second round of the municipal 
election. However, the city council was lost in a by-election in June 1992, where a broad coalition of all 
mainstream parties stood up against the FN mayor and achieved an overall majority of 55.5 per cent of the vote 
cast. 
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The above exploration of the FN’s position within the local party system will then be 
complemented with a qualitative evaluation of the party’s performances in municipal office in 
Toulon, Marignane, Orange and Vitrolles. A characterisation of two distinct models of policy-
seeking vs. vote-maximising styles of municipal governance is suggested. As will be 
discussed, the examination of the (so far) unsuccessful campaigns of the extreme right in 
Hénin-Beaumont shows a number of similarities with the tactical line of ‘non-partisan’ and 
locally based canvassing adopted by some local leaders of the FN in the mid-1990s. Yet this 
attempt at toning down the traditional political message by the FN should not be considered a 
significant departure from ideological orthodoxy. Nor would it fit an always moving line of 
intra-party opposition between so-called hard and soft-liners. On the contrary, reviewing 
social and cultural policy-making across the four localities under FN administration will stress 
the persistence of a common far right agenda, together with the development of nepotism and 
political patronage. 
 
 
1. Political opportunity structures at local level 
 
Looking back at the French political scene of the mid-1990s, one must recall the continuing 
electoral strength of the FN and its impact on the overall balances of forces within the party 
system (Martin, 2000). Despite its increasing weight, the party had not managed to escape the 
margins of the national political system, where it had been confined by its anthropology from 
within the post-1945 historically de-legitimised neo-fascist and national-conservative camp 
(Camus & Monzat, 1992). As early as 1985, however, this political isolation and lack of 
coalition potential by the FN nationally had come in sharp contrast with the actual 
development of collusive strategies by leaders of the mainstream right at local level and the 
recurrent building of tactical alliances in the field. 
 
With particularly high levels of popular support in Southern France, the FN had become a 
serious challenger to local actors of the mainstream right. In the 1988 presidential election, Le 
Pen had achieved his best scores in Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur with 25 per cent of the vote. 
In the subsequent legislative ballot, a number of prominent party leaders –including Le Pen 
himself– had travelled to this new electoral eldorado hoping for ‘safe-seat’ constituencies. By 
the time of the 1995 municipal election, the FN had surpassed the 30 per cent threshold across 
a significant number of localities in the region. In a similar vein, the more recent attempt by 
Marine Le Pen to set foot on Northern territories is largely accounted for by the changing 
balance of forces and the growth of the extreme right vote in the large working class areas of 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais (in the first round of the 2007 legislatives, Le Pen polled no less than 
29.2 per cent of vote). 
 
In the Southern part of France, in particular, the many opportunities offered to the FN by local 
leaders of the mainstream right to enter ad hoc coalitions in the earlier stage of its 
development contributed a significant deal to establishing the status of the party as a 
legitimate political actor within the system and laying the foundations of future public 
acceptance of municipal incumbency by the extreme right2. 
 
                                                 
2
 In the 1986 regional contest, the RPR/UDF cartel called for the support from the far right to achieve an overall 
majority in 7 out of the 22 regional councils (Aquitaine, Franche-Comté, Languedoc-Roussillon, Haute-
Normandie, Picardie, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Midi-Pyrénées). In return, Le Pen’s party was entrusted with 
executive vice-presidencies in four of the above regions. 
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In the highly ideologically polarised context of the mid-1980s, the ‘incorporative’ approach –
as then theorised by Mediterranean UDF leaders Jean-Claude Gaudin or Jacques Blanc for 
instance– was predominantly seen as part of the response to the shock caused by the victory 
of the left in 1981 and the consequent alternation in power by the socialist-led alliance with 
the PC. The virulent anti-communist ideological element in the legitimisation of local 
agreements with the FN had, for example, already been central to the tactical manoeuvring in 
the critical municipal by-election of Dreux in September 1983. What was to become the 
founding event in bestowing political respectability upon the Front national was countenanced 
by a number of key representatives of the RPR/UDF on the ground that the FN was less an 
immediate danger than the ‘socialo-communist’ leftist cartel and the participation of the so-
called ‘Red Fascists’ in government. The period also coincided with the FN’s attempt at 
building links with the mainstream right through conservative factions and think-tanks, most 
notably the Club de l’Horloge. The FN’s tactics of opening-up attracted a number of defectors 
who helped sustain the party’s efforts to acquire political legitimacy and a more acceptable 
public image. For the vast majority, these ‘showcase’ politicians subsequently left the FN 
(Birenbaum, 1992)3. 
 
 
Paving the way for populists: ideological congruence and organisational ‘porosity’ in the 
mainstream right 
 
The de-facto recognition of the FN as part of the right-wing family had been facilitated by the 
high level of ideological congruence that existed among representatives of the mainstream 
and extreme right regionally. To some extent, the hard stance on immigration or crime taken 
historically by a number of local right-wing politicians paved the way for the advent of FN in 
municipal power. Widespread anti-Arab prejudice was pervasive in the regional elite’s 
political culture as was evident from the development of an openly racist discourse 
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Most notably, Maurice Arreckx, UDF mayor of Toulon 
from 1959 to 1985, built part of his longstanding electoral career on the controversial 
politicisation of immigration issues and the recurrent use of xenophobic mobilisatory slogans 
such as ‘Toulon wants to stay Toulon’ or ‘more than 10 per cent foreigners is not tolerable in 
our cities’. To quote Arreckx from a (in)famous interview that he gave to Swedish newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter in 1976: 'Racism has nothing to do with politics. It's in our guts. Arabs are 
different from us. They like to live their way with 7 or 8 people in one room. They have 
different habits. Go take a look at what's happening down on Theatre Square: a French girl 
just can't sit down more than two minutes before three Arabs come and start to brandish 
what's down their trousers'. His successor, François Trucy (UDF) did follow in his mentor’s 
footsteps: “I am not xenophobic but I believe unemployment, North-African overpopulation 
and tramps are the root causes of crime (…) There is at the moment one race that is driving 
another one out, just like the red ants from Argentina have driven the black ants out of 
Provence. I just want the Toulonnais back in Toulon” (Le Monde, 23.04.1986). 
 
                                                 
3
 This collusive strategy of notabilisation was politically formalised in 1986 through establishing 
Rassemblement national proportional lists bringing together Le Pen’s Front national, Mégret’s Confédération 
pour l'Avenir et le Renouveau (CODAR) and parent Comités d’Action républicaine (CAR), as well as members 
of the Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNI/CNIP) such as Olivier d’Ormesson, Yvon Briant, 
Edouard Frédéric-Dupont, Michel de Rostolan or Philippe Malaud. 
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Notwithstanding proximity in policy positions, there is also a clear evidence of the links that 
existed between the constellation of far right small groups and think-tanks, on the one hand, 
and the more established parties of the mainstream conservative or centre-right on the other, 
most evidently in Southern France where organisational ‘porosity’ was perhaps higher (Blöss 
et al., 1999). At local level, the ideological promiscuity of the mainstream right with the FN 
has been historically maintained by the close links built through a number of interconnected 
groups which served as bridging organisations and locus for political networking. As put by 
UDF leaders in Marseille in the early 1990s as an attempt to justify past and future 
accommodation of the FN: ‘There has been enough quibbling. This problem is a pain for 
everybody [sic] and we are not happy about making such deals. But the FN representatives 
are people we have always mixed with and with whom we have talks that we often don’t have 
with the Socialists’ (Le Monde, 06.06.1990). The blurring of partisan differences is similarly 
well in evidence in the Marignane case where the FN candidate Daniel Simonpieri had 
initially served as deputy-mayor for UDF-PR mayor Laurent Deleuil from 1989 to 1995 
before turning to the extreme right. 
 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, the particularly strong anti-Gaullist element brought 
together former OAS and Tixier-Vignancour supporters with members of the Républicains 
Indépendants (RI) (Rémond, 2005) among whom were found some of the instigators of future 
political co-operation with the far right such as Jean-Claude Gaudin, Jacques Blanc, Jacques 
Médecin, Laurent Deleuil, Maurice Arreckx or Jacques Peyrat. A significant number of FN 
regional candidates in 1986 were drawn from the ranks of the UDF-PR (e.g. Jacques Vaysse-
Tempé, Jean-Marie Le Chevallier, Jean-Yves Le Gallou or Jean Durieux). The Bouches-du-
Rhône and the Var cases are of particular relevance to analysing the significance of this 
pattern of collusion in the local political elites across the wide spectrum of the non-Gaullist 
right, from Republican centrists to right-wing extremists. In the 1985 cantonal elections, local 
representatives of the UDF and the FN coalesced in order to defeat RPR candidates in 
Marseille. In 1986, the PACA region was won by Gaudin with the support of the FN. In 1988, 
the FN and the mainstream right agreed again on reciprocal withdrawal procedures in the 
legislative election in Marseille, whereby eight of the extreme right representatives were able 
to stand alone in opposing the left in the second round, and the FN stepped down from 6 
constituencies in the Bouches-du-Rhône department and a total of another 10 constituencies 
in the whole of the PACA region. In the Var department, Maurice Arreckx would have no 
hesitation in calling for voters to support FN candidate Yann Piat against the socialist party. 
 
In Mediterranean France, the above ideological, personal and organisational connexions were 
reinforced by the social base of support inherent in the large community of French pieds-noirs 
settlers repatriated from Algeria following the country’s independence in 1962 (Delpard, 
2002; Verdès-Leroux, 2001). The pieds-noirs' influence on the dissemination of anti-Arab 
feelings in local party politics, and how the latter were instrumentalised by right-wing 
political actors has been well documented (Stora, 1999). In the city of Nice, for instance, the 
strategy of seduction by the longstanding municipal dynasty of the Médecin family is a very 
interesting occurrence of this process of electorally integrating French repatriates from North-
Africa through the distribution of patronage and the allocation of political symbols such as 
'French Algeria' memorials (Olivesi, 2002; Branche, 2005). At local level, the specific 
contribution by the pieds-noirs to building party structures (Rouhan, 1997; Comtat, 2009) 
and, to some extent, the electoral constituency of the extreme right (Veugelers, 2005) would 
later be manifest in other areas with high density of ex-colonials such as Marignane, 
Carpentras, Bollène or Toulon. From an historical perspective, it must be recalled that pro-
French Algeria candidate Tixier-Vignancour had come in the third place in three 
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Mediterranean departments (Bouches-du-Rhône, Var, Alpes-Maritimes) with over 15 per cent 
of the vote in the first round of the 1965 presidential election (as opposed to 5.2 per cent 
nationwide). In Toulon, links between the extreme right and the pieds-noirs community were 
further formalised in 1987 through the creation of a FN-flanking organisation (i.e. Cercle 
National des Rapatriés, CNR) by former Algérie Française proponents and OAS activists 
such as Albert Peyron or Pierre Sergent. The effect of political canvassing by a number of 
pieds-noirs voluntary associations during the FN municipal campaigns of 1995 in Toulon and 
Marignane was acknowledged by the newly elected city councils building symbolic memorial 
stones associated with historical figures of the clandestine fight for French Algeria. 
 
 
Anti-tax demagoguery and the anti-corruption agenda. 
 
One last important element of contextualisation is that of political corruption and financial 
mismanagement. In France, mass dissatisfaction with the traditional political elite can be 
considered a key factor of the electoral dynamics of the FN since the mid-1980s. At national 
level, political resentment has been fuelled by the anti-system rhetoric of the far right and has 
in return allowed for cross-cleavage mobilisation (Perrineau, 1998; Mayer, 2002). Locally, 
profound public discontent with the political elite must be regarded as a crucial determinant of 
the FN’s ability to take over city councils. Most prominently, the success of the party in 
Toulon was closely associated with the fall of the ‘Arreckx’ system of corruption that had 
been uncovered by the assassination of then-UDF parliamentarian Yann Piat. The unfolding 
of the scandal had led to the arrest of Arreckx and his imprisonment on multiple charges of 
corruption in 1994. To a lesser extent, a similar situation arose in Vitrolles where charges of 
falsification and corruption were brought against PS candidate Jean-Jacques Anglade in 
December 1995. Electoral consequences were foreseeable in an opinion poll conducted in 
October 1996, which showed the citizens' growing lack of faith in the local administration: no 
less than 58 per cent of the population were dissatisfied with the outgoing mayor while only a 
mere 5 per cent would see him as ‘honest’ (SOFRES-Le Nouvel Observateur, February 1997). 
More recently, political corruption topped the agenda of the 2008 and 2009 municipal 
elections in the Northern city of Hénin-Beaumont where FN vice-president Marine Le Pen 
came close to winning. Following suspicion of fraud, incumbent PS mayor Gérard 
Dalongeville was arrested together with members of his cabinet in April 2009 on charges of 
forged invoices and fictitious deals. Media exposure of corrupt dealings by the city 
administration resulted in a significant electoral boost for the far right: in the first round of the 
July 2009 by-election, the FN list won 39.3 per cent of the vote, an increase of 10.8 on the 
party's score in the previous municipal ballot of March 2008. 
 
Attacks on corruption, financial malpractices and growing deficit in the municipalities were 
central to the local election agenda of the far right, with a particular emphasis on local taxes 
and public distrust in politicians. To some extent, this shift was a departure from the more 
established nativist and welfare-chauvinist policies promoted by the party nationally. A core 
feature of the FN's neo-liberal agenda in the 1980s, anti-tax protest had indeed lost some of its 
salience in the subsequent programmatic development of the FN, as the party chose to adopt 
more 'centrist' positions on the socio-economic cleavage to consolidate its leadership among 
working class and lower social strata voters (Ivaldi 2003). At local level, however, fiscal 
issues regained prominence with protest being directed against increasing council taxes, 
misdirecting of public monies and financial distress. In Toulon, for instance, the city 
administration was over € 300 million in debt on the eve of the 1995 election. In 2008, the 
municipal election in Hénin-Beaumont was predominantly fought over taxes and law-and-
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order: the latter were considered the most salient issues by 41 and 45 per cent of the voters 
respectively (IFOP-La Voix du Nord, 13.02.2008). In 2004, a report by the Regional Financial 
Audit Chamber had revealed a €12 million consolidated deficit and pushed for debt 
repayment action in the form of a 85 per cent increase in local taxes. The municipal platform 
presented by the FN in December 2007 made fiscal protest a cornerstone to the party's claim 
to 'streamline the city's financial management' by cutting down the current administration's 
'sumptuous lifestyle', conducting a 'drastic reduction in the number of municipal staff' and 
putting 'a halt to fictitious jobs'. 
 
 
 
2. Models of local governance 
 
The account of the local opportunity structures that fostered the FN municipal success in the 
1990s stresses the political process whereby right-wing extremist leaders obtain mainstream 
legitimacy and get their passport to power. The significance of this process of pulling 
ostracised peripheral actors in the region of political acceptability should not be overlooked 
and, as suggested, cannot be reduced to the simple arithmetic of change in the electoral 
balance of forces. On the other hand, the ability by extremist parties to enter the arena of 
regular party co-operation is equally dependent upon adaptative strategies and policy 
alterations on their part. In the case of the FN, the early 1990s were a time of growing 
realisation by the party leadership that prospects of gaining parliamentary representation were 
almost null and therefore their national coalition potential waning. In response, the FN shifted 
its own position and moved away from a conciliatory attitude towards a ‘neither left, nor 
right’ repositioning of the party as a radicalised third competitive bloc (Ivaldi, 2003). With the 
1995/97 local successes coming at this critical strategic juncture, the political and symbolic 
management of municipal office became of the utmost importance. Diverging strategic views 
led to bitter top-down intra-party conflict. 
 
 
 ‘Policy-seeking’ vs. ‘vote-seeking’ style of municipal governance 
 
In this specific context, the qualitative analysis of the FN's performances in municipal office 
suggests a characterisation of two relatively distinct patterns of municipal governance: one 
'policy-seeking' found in Vitrolles and Toulon, the other 'vote-maximising' in Marignane and 
Orange. These two models were connected to personality factors and the diverging strategic 
goals by the local representatives of the party across the four localities. 
 
The unprecedented experience of holding municipal power was obviously considered by Le 
Pen’s party an opportunity to prove itself a credible and legitimate alternative to the 
RPR/UDF condominium. The crucial strategic value of the localities was acknowledged by 
the FN leader: 'these mayors have been elected on FN lists and on the party's platform, under 
the patronage of the FN and its president (…) Their cities must become the new bases and a 
window for national reconquest' (Le Monde, 31.10.1995). In the immediate aftermath of the 
1995 municipal success, a number of key national speakers of the party took strong positions 
in the media to stress the need for the newly elected mayors to bring forward visible measures 
of ‘national preference’. As put for example by Marie-France Stirbois with regard to council 
housing: ‘if the applicant is French, he will get a council flat. If he is a foreigner, then he shall 
be put at the bottom of the waiting list’ (Le Monde, 18.06.1995). 
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This notion of a locus for almost experimentally implementing some of the key measures of 
the FN political agenda, and therefore establishing the viability and applicability of the far 
right’s programme at national level, was central to the policy-oriented style of local 
governance developed in Toulon and even more visibly in Vitrolles. In the latter especially, it 
was clear that some of the most controversial measures by ruling Mégret couple were given 
particular emphasis in order to attract as much publicity as possible, thereby serving the 
party’s national goal of policy differentiation. Hence for instance some of the contentious 
interviews by Catherine Mégret with regards to the most cherished ‘national preference’ 
discriminatory scheme or her unconditional supporting of Le Pen’s highly controversial 
statement on ‘fundamental racial inequalities’ (Berliner Zeitung, 24.02.1997). 
 
Not surprisingly, the first actual experience of implementing measures of ‘national 
preference’ locally was found in Vitrolles in January 1998 after the FN city council had 
decided for a specific child-allowance to the sole benefits of French or EU citizens. As 
explained by Bruno Mégret: ‘It is normal that the French have priority at home just like 
Europeans in Europe’. Despite previous judicial setbacks4, the national preference card was 
played again in the 2001 campaign where the FN candidate circulated a pamphlet entitled 
'Bien de chez nous' against the so-called 'reverse colonisation by immigration'. The tract 
announced the city council's intention to by-pass the legal framework in order to 'give priority 
to the French in terms of municipal jobs, social benefits and council housing'. Similarly, in 
Toulon, there undoubtedly were more or less hidden discriminatory practices. This was for 
instance acknowledged in veiled general terms by FN municipal councillor Eliane de la 
Brosse: ‘it’s true that we tend to help French families first. We do indeed ask for identity 
cards and other documents. We are first concerned about the French who are experiencing 
great economic difficulties, and only after do we take care of others. It’s not about rejecting 
others, rather it is putting the interest of our children and families first, if they don’t have 
everything they are entitled to’ (interview, 02.03.1999). Similar practices were uncovered for 
instance by the case brought against FN deputy-mayor Philippe Viard in May 1998 following 
a complaint lodged by a local shopkeeper of Harki origin after her application to purchase a 
burial plot had been turned down (La Dépêche, 06.05.1998).  
 
At variance with the programmatic goals set by Le Pen, the model of governance that 
dominated in Marignane and Orange was rather one of shedding political skin in favour of a 
more neutral style of management (Viard, 1996). Here the main goal was to focus on personal 
entrenchment at municipal level and avoid the amount of media scrutiny under which their 
counterparts were going in Vitrolles and Toulon because of the more overt ideological stance 
taken in decision-making. In Orange, for instance, visible urban development programmes 
were carried out by the FN administration to improve main streets and gardens in the city 
centre, or provide for local car parks free of charge. The ‘apolitical management’ put forward 
by Simonpieri and Bompard later allowed its two proponents to move away from the FN to 
join Sarkozy’s UMP and Villiers’ MPF respectively. 
 
                                                 
4
 In examining conditions of eligibility for this special allowance, the Aix-en-Provence Court later ruled against 
a clear infringement of fundamental principles of equal rights. It gave Catherine Mégret and deputy-Mayor 
Hubert Fayard a suspended three-month prison sentence, together with 2 years of ineligibility for public office 
and a fine of about 15,000 Euros. 
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Internally, the municipal success of 1995/97 triggered a ‘centre/periphery’ cleavage between 
national leadership and newly elected local notables, a line of conflict which was relatively 
new to the FN’s highly centralised and hierarchical party organisation. The incapacity to 
incorporate those antagonist views showed the strong constraints imposed on the party’s 
development at local level.  In 2004/05, the bitter dispute between Bompard and Le Pen led 
eventually to the former being expelled from the Front national. The struggle confirmed that 
Bompard’s pragmatic governance had formed part of a broader political strategy whose 
priority was to consolidate the party at local level rather than pursuing what was considered a 
‘pointless’ presidential ambition, be it with Le Pen’s populist charisma and voluminous media 
coverage. 
 
In many respects, the ‘non-partisan’ and locally based canvassing by the FN in the municipal 
campaigns of 2008 and 2009 in Hénin-Beaumont showed that lessons from the past had been 
learned. Following Marine Le Pen’s successful personal endeavour in the 2007 legislative 
elections, the municipal ticket that was put forward in the 2008 municipal ballot was a clear 
attempt at cross-cutting the local/national cleavage. With Marine Le Pen placed in second 
position on the party list, the priority was given to FN local representative Steeve Briois, a 
well-known 'enfant du pays' (born-and-bred) figure of the regional political scene and 
municipal councillor since the mid-1990s. Although there is very little doubt that the Hénin-
Beaumont campaign was primarily a vehicle for Marine Le Pen’s personal ambition 
nationally, the low-profile approach manifested in many ways. Symbolically, it was obvious 
in the changes made to the 2008 electoral posters (see below) which put her in the background 
while carefully avoiding any mention of the FN name or logo. 
 
 
Figure 1. FN electoral posters for the 2008 municipal campaign in Hénin-Beaumont 
 
 
1st round 
 
 
 
2nd round 
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Such strategic attempts by FN representatives at playing down the partisan card locally were 
closely associated with personality factors and candidate notability. The promotion of a strong 
ideological policy-seeking agenda was found in the two FN municipalities where the actual 
leaders did not originate in the local political inner circles. Instead they had been tactically 
brought in from national party apparatus by the late 1980s. Marine Le Pen’s move to Pas-de-
Calais in the 2007 legislative ballot was another clear instance of electoral ‘airdropping’. This 
was also the case for both Jean-Marie Le Chevallier and Bruno Mégret whose political 
installation in the Var and Bouches-du-Rhône departments respectively had begun in the 1988 
legislative elections after both of them had defected from the mainstream right to join the FN 
a few years earlier. In contrast, Orange’s mayor Jacques Bompard was for instance an 
historical figure of the far right in Vaucluse and had led the party’s departmental federation 
since 1975 after participating in some of the most radical nationalist groups such as Occident 
or Ordre Nouveau. Even more paradoxically perhaps, proponents of policy-oriented 
governance at local level such as Mégret or Le Chevallier were regarded as representatives of 
a group of ‘moderate’ elites –at least more open to political co-operation with the mainstream 
right– amongst the various factions constitutive the FN national leadership at the time. 
 
 
Ideological constraints and the authoritarian agenda 
 
That forms of ‘non-partisan’ governance were found in Orange or Marignane should by no 
means be interpreted as a significant move away from political orthodoxy: on the contrary, 
reviewing actual policy-making across the four localities under FN administration shows the 
persistence of the classic authoritarian agenda of the far right. Across all four city councils, 
priorities were indeed very similar, beginning with a strong emphasis on social and cultural 
policies. 
 
At party level, this social-authoritarian component can be considered an expression of the 
national-conservative ideology of the Catholic counter-revolutionary fringe of the French 
extreme right, which had joined forces with the FN in the mid-1980s. Additionally, by the 
early 1990s, the focus on ‘culture’ became an integral part of the political strategy by the FN 
nationally (Ivaldi, 2007). With a rather dubious appeal to Gramsci and a much clearer 
reference to the primacy of culture in the ideology of the new right (GRECE), the 300 
Measures for France’s Revival (1993) called for the FN to influence the political debate by 
promoting traditional cultural values against the established ‘intelligentsia’ and ‘intellectual 
terrorism’ by the left. As was then formalised by Pierre Vial or Mégret, there was an 
immediate threat to traditional values of social cohesion and harmony embodied in so-called 
‘Rap-Tag-Lang’ alternative left-wing libertarianism, which commanded to ‘wage a war on the 
degeneration of art and culture’ (Le Monde, 06.02.1992). These themes would be further 
emphasised in the party’s summer university of La Grande-Motte in August 1996. 
 
Locally, it soon became evident that all FN mayors would put those principles into practice. 
In Toulon, Le Chevallier made clear his intention to ‘give back the Toulonnais their 
Provencal culture’. Fierce rejection of modernity manifested in systematic attacks on popular 
art festivals (e.g. Châteauvallon in Toulon or the Chorégies in Orange) or leading anti-racist 
organisations and youth cultural associations through drastic financial cuts in city council 
subsidies. The bitter controversy over the Sous-Marin café in Vitrolles, and ultimately its 
forcible relocation in the neighbouring city of Gardanne, together with the closing of the 
Lumières cinema on the account of its showing of ‘unwanted’ short-films on HIV/AIDS or 
Bompard and Simonpieri’s policy of systematically excluding so-called ‘cosmopolitarian’ 
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books from public libraries in Orange and Marignane, were among the many examples of the 
FN’s municipal politics of ‘cultural restoration’ inspired by social authoritarianism and 
sustained by the longstanding conspiracy theory on the far right. In Toulon, another 
controversial decision was to cancel the invitation for French-Jewish novelist Marek Halter to 
participate in the city’s book festival to the benefit of a number of far right writers and 
publishers5. 
 
It must be noted here that this political struggle against the alleged contemporary ‘cultural 
diktat’ of the left was not restricted to municipalities. Significantly, a similar pattern was 
reproduced in some of the regions where the FN had obtained a right to vote on regional 
council subsidies after forming alliance with the RPD/UDF in March 1998. In Languedoc-
Roussillon, for instance, the FN was in a position to impose severe cuts in the monies 
allocated to a number of cultural associations such as the Théâtre des Treize Vents, the Centre 
chorégraphique de Montpellier, the Festival de Danse de Montpellier or the Festival de 
Cinéma Méditerranéen. Similarly, in Rhône-Alpes, Pierre Vial, the FN Regional Vice-
President for Culture, led the council majority into reducing significantly the amount of 
financial support to a number of art and cultural events such as the Biennial Festival of Dance 
and that of Modern Art. 
 
Placed under the yoke of far right ideology, FN social policies illustrated the party’s inability 
to conceive some of the most salient issues inherent in the transformation of contemporary 
French society (Martin et al, 1999). The strong authoritarian tropism translated into sectoral 
re-allocation of council financial resources and the targeting of the party's traditional clientele 
at local level. This echoed the national party’s aim to spread its influence across a wide range 
social groups, beginning with constituencies most susceptible to extreme right appeal (Ivaldi, 
1998). At local level, policies were predominantly aimed at well-identified groups of 
supporters such as veterans, repatriates, the military, police officers, small business owners 
and traders, shopkeepers. Across the cities of Orange, Marignane and Toulon, the linkage was 
particularly strong due to the substantial contingent of military and police. In Toulon, the 
political influence of the local naval arsenal was perceptible in the re-allocation of municipal 
funds to veterans as well as in the making of Le Chevallier’s support committee for the 1995 
campaign, which had brought together high ranking officers of the Navy and former Arsenal 
executives. 
 
These policies proved highly inefficient however in addressing crucial issues that would fall 
outside the extreme right’s ‘traditional community’, such as social deprivation, youth and 
ethnic minorities, abortion, drug abuse, the prevention of HIV/AIDS or the development of 
single-parent families. In Toulon, for instance, this led to the FN stopping the city’s financial 
support to the well-established AIDES charity on the ground that it was an ‘association of 
homosexuals disguised in an organisation in favour of victims of HIV/AIDS’ (in Le 
Toulonnais, city-council newsletter, 02.12.1995). Social discrimination was equally clear in 
the decision by the Orange FN mayor to withdraw from a number of local development 
schemes in the socially deprived and high foreign population density inner suburbs of Aygues 
and Fourchevieilles. Eliane de la Brosse, member of the FN administration in Toulon, 
accounted for policy shifts as follows: ‘I speak as a member of the FN […] We are concerned 
with everybody’s well-being but perhaps we do turn more specifically to the elderly, those 
retired and families. I must remind you how important, as a concept, family is to us. Children 
                                                 
5
 In a similar vein, the renaming of Vitrolles’ Jean-Marie Tjibaou avenue (after former Kanak independence 
leader in French New-Caledonia) into Jean-Pierre Stirbois (former FN Secretary General) bore testimony to the 
symbolic importance given by the FN to making its own mark at local level. 
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must be protected by fathers but brought up and lulled by mothers. To us family is the basis of 
society, its future’ (interview, 02.03.1999). 
 
Attempts to reinforce existing electoral loyalties by political patronage were equally clear in 
the management of city council subsidies to local charities and selective re-allocation of 
municipal funds and facilities to FN flanking organisations such as Fraternité Française (FF) 
or the Front Anti-Chômage (FAC)6 at the expenses of long established associations tackling 
poverty and social exclusion such as the Secours Populaire or the Restaurants du Coeur, as 
well as a number of local humanitarian initiatives e.g. the Oustao charity in the socially 
deprived area of L’Aygues in Orange, the Kiffa association in Vitrolles or Les Amis de 
Jéricho in Toulon. 
 
 
Political patronage and nepotism 
 
This building up of an electoral clientele by distributing city council largesse and delivering 
social benefits conform to the interests of the FN core electorate was in many cases 
accompanied with political corruption and municipal nepotism. Covert discriminatory 
practices took the form of sanctions on politically undesirable left-wing political supporters or 
trade union members among city council staff. One tangible and particularly dramatic effect 
of this witch-hunt was to force a number of people into resigning from their positions within 
the local administration while others were made redundant for alleged reasons of budgetary 
discipline. Across all localities, political favouritism was channelled through local 
bureaucracy. Party members and supporters were rewarded by appointments in public posts. 
In May 1998, Cendrine Le Chevallier, deputy-mayor in Toulon, was for instance charged with 
discrimination in appointments to the city council’s flanking organisation Jeunesse 
Toulonnaise following her attempt to distribute all available positions to FN sympathisers. 
 
Local nepotism was also manifest in the long list of job opportunities offered to family 
members and personal friends. The attempt by the FN to establish new familial dynasties at 
local level was best evidenced in the party choosing to put forward both Catherine Mégret and 
Cendrine Le Chevallier in replacement of their husbands. Beside these most visible attempts, 
it is important to note that a significant number of appointments were made to promote 
relatives, friends and party members. In this, the extreme right in office did undoubtedly fit 
the long established tradition of municipal clientelism, personal fiefs and notability in 
Mediterranean France (see for instance Briquet and Sawicki, 1988). Although hardly 
measurable in a strict quantitative perspective, the scale of political patronage under FN 
administration might have been of smaller magnitude than that observed under the earlier 
reigns of regional barons of the mainstream left and right. What was more significant 
however was that the development of patronage in the FN localities came at total variance 
with the national party line of claiming exemplarity and an immaculate record (recall for 
instance the ‘Tête haute, mains propres’ campaign against political corruption in the 1990s). 
 
                                                 
6
 The FAC was founded within the FN by Noël Lantz et Jacques Deschanel as early as 1987 but remained 
marginal to the party’s strategy of spreading its electoral influence through peripheral organisations. In February 
1994, the FAC merged with the newly formed Association de recherche pour l'emploi des jeunes (ARPEJ) under 
the auspices of the FNJ leader, Samuel Maréchal. FF was founded in 1988 by Pierre Vial et Jean-Pierre Stirbois, 
and has since been chaired by Mireille d’Ornano, head of the FN in Hautes-Alpes. 
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Lastly, the outcome of the FN holding executive local office is one of financial 
mismanagement, poor budgetary control and underdeveloped expertise in the party at the time 
of entering municipal councils (see Samson, 1997; Ferri & Turc, 1996). Largely a 
consequence of political favouritism, there were also occurrences of financial embezzlement. 
For instance, the complete failure by Le Chevallier to develop the Vallon du Soleil youth 
recreational centre in Toulon, or the sharp criticism contained in the report on the Vitrolles 
administration by the Regional Audit Office, provided strong evidence of recurrent 
malpractices in municipal management. By the end of the Chevallier’s mandate, the city of 
Toulon was no less than € 215 million in debt with an increase of about 30 per cent in the 
number of staff employed by the council. The private audit commissioned by the newly 
elected majority in 2001 pointed to ‘non sincere accounting’ and revealed that the various 
semi-public companies (SEM) operated by the council would add a financial burden of € 61 
million to the existing debt load. In Vitrolles, the public audit conducted in May 2002 
unveiled a complex system of balancing the city’s main budgetary deficit with an increase in 
prices for water distribution by a satellite company, whose sole political purpose was to allow 
for an electorally rewarding reduction in local taxes. The report pointed also to a number of 
side payments out of city council resources to cover for preparation of Mégret’s presidential 
campaign of 2002 (including the purchase of mobile phones, substantial post and telephone 
bills or the refund of campaigning costs). More recently, former Marignane mayor Daniel 
Simonpieri was charged with suspicion of fraud and misappropriation of funds in negotiating 
public contracts during his time in office from 1995 to 2008. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The assessment of the FN assuming local power in France in the 1990s sheds a particular light 
on the more general phenomenon of populist parties in office. First because it offers a relevant 
case of the extreme right exercising power on its own, without coalition building constraints 
imposed upon junior partners in more general collaborative settings. Second, because of the 
hardly contestable extreme right pedigree of the party and Le Pen's long record of anti-system 
struggle within the nationalist camp since the mid-1950s. This unequivocal anthropology of 
the FN presupposed to identify the mechanism whereby the party managed to escape the 
fringes of the political system to proceed to the arena of normal politics. The above analysis 
has tried to outline the influence of crucial historical and ideological factors in Mediterranean 
France, which contributed to the electoral rise of the FN and facilitated its installation as a 
legitimate contender for municipal power. 
 
With regard to the party in municipal office, what has been suggested is to distinguish 
between two models of governance along a ‘policy’ vs. ‘office-seeking” line of division. In 
many respects, the recent attempt by Marine Le Pen to take hold of Hénin-Beaumont would 
fit the second category quite well, although a closer connexion with national party leadership 
would for obvious reasons be maintained. 
 
The distinctiveness in styles of local management did not relate to any structural ideological 
or historical cleavage within the party elite. Rather it would reveal the emergence of a new 
'centre vs. periphery' line of division coming as a strong challenge to the highly centralised 
and hierarchical model of leadership in the FN. In concrete terms, social and cultural policies 
shared many commonalities across all four localities, and bore testimony to the salience of the 
classic authoritarian agenda in the far right. Lastly, the few years of extreme right incumbency 
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were dominated by the development of political patronage, nepotism and financial 
malpractices, which to a large extent accounted for the subsequent electoral misfortunes of the 
FN mayors. 
 
Any systematic assessment of negative incumbency effects by style of management in the FN 
localities is made difficult by the small number of cases at hand. Arguably, there was a 
notable electoral 'bounty' given to proponents of the more pragmatic approach of local 
government in Marignane and Orange: in the former city, MNR candidate Simonpieri 
received 47.8 per cent of the vote in the first round –despite the FN putting forward his own 
candidate7. The outgoing mayor won the second round with an impressive 62.5 per cent 
against his mainstream right-wing opponent. For his part, Orange's FN mayor Bompard won 
the municipal contest in the first round with 60 per cent of the vote. These plebiscitary 
successes contrasted with the scores by MNR and FN candidates in Vitrolles and, most 
evidently, Toulon. In the former, Catherine Mégret achieved a narrow victory with 45.3 per 
cent of the vote in a 3-party second-round contest. In Toulon, the extreme right suffered 
massive electoral losses in 2001 after the FN group in the city council had broken up into four 
rival factions: ex-FN Le Chevallier's list 'Toulon d'abord' received a mere 7.8 per cent of the 
vote; together, other far right candidates totalled another 7.5 per cent. 
 
Political misbehaviour and poor financial governance by the local FN are key explanatory 
factors of the observed variance in electoral performances. The somehow ironic reversal of 
the anti-corruption vote that had originally contributed to the advent of the far right became 
manifest in Toulon where revelations of political and tabloid-like sexual scandals added to the 
already disastrous impact of blatant managerial incompetence. A similar pattern arose in the 
October 2002 municipal by-election in Vitrolles where Catherine Mégret failed to secure a 
majority vote (45.9 per cent) in the second round against the socialist candidate after both 
husband and wife had been charged with irregularities in party financing. 
 
All this said, there are of course limitations to examining the significance of extreme right 
governance at local level. Most importantly, the ex-post analysis of populist incumbency must 
take into account the limited powers delegated to municipalities by national government in 
France. At the time of the FN seizing local administration, management by city councils 
concerned predominantly 'everyday life' areas e.g. road networks, crèches, water supply, 
retirement homes or social housing. In the absence of powers of more general competence 
such as those given to regional and departmental authorities, far right mayors had restricted 
freedom to act legally. They were not in a position to address some of the key issues that 
traditionally matters most to FN voters, such as immigration, unemployment or crime. With 
respect to the former issue, for instance, the local FN had little power to weigh effectively on 
immigration flows, family re-unification or legal acquisition of French citizenship by 
foreigners. Moreover, high-profile welfare-chauvinist policies in Vitrolles or Toulon came up 
against the reality of strict anti-discrimination and equal rights legislations. In a similar vein, 
prior to the February 2002 and August 2004 laws on 'proximity democracy', municipalities in 
France were not given the possibility to enter concrete economic partnerships with private 
companies at local level, which did place significant limitations on the possibility to fund 
economic initiatives that would help foster activity in the local labour pool. 
 
                                                 
7
 Let us recall that in 1999 the national dispute between Le Pen and Mégret over party leadership was replicated 
at local level and led to similar conflicts between major groups of power-holders in the municipalities. After the 
split by the mégrétiste faction, the MNR secured the city councils of Marignane and Vitrolles while the FN 
maintained control over Orange and Toulon. 
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The issue of law and order enforcement is one final example of the legal constraints on 
existing levers for municipal governance. The use of ‘insecurity’ rhetoric was a common 
feature in the political discourse of the far right locally. These were accompanied with claims 
of more repressive policies, and narratives of the newly elected authorities taking firm actions 
to re-establish public order. Hence Catherine Mégret claiming that ‘from now on, fear will be 
on the other side’. During the election campaigns, this met existing fears and public concerns. 
Yet, in practice, the hard stance on crime was restricted to increasing municipal police 
workforces with little power to tackle criminality effectively, mostly because of limited 
control by city councils in law and order enforcement, which at that time would still fall 
predominantly within national government competence under the authority of departmental 
préfets. 
 
Lastly, despite the vast amount of media attention throughout the period of municipal 
incumbency by the extreme right, the FN experience as power-holder remained a relatively 
marginal phenomenon. We should be cautious of distortion or amplification risks inherent in 
the short lenses employed to scrutinise the FN policy impact at local level. Beyond all 
questions legitimately raised by the presence of the extreme right in municipal government in 
France, another perhaps more crucial issue is that of the long-term policy impact by the FN on 
strategic re-orientations in parties of the mainstream right nationally. Since the mid-1980s, 
attempts by the RPR/UDF cartel to confine the FN to the margins of the party system have 
been accompanied with a clear process of self-appropriation of the extreme right agenda on 
immigration and law-and-order, as revealed significant shifts in policy-making in those areas 
(Fassin et al, 1997; Ritaine, 2005; Schain, 2006). This adaptative process culminated in the 
profound ideological revision undertaken by the French right under Sarkozy’s leadership in 
order to reclaim votes from the FN (Ivaldi, 2008) or, most recently, in the highly instrumental 
and controversial debate on 'national identity' poorly orchestrated by the UMP government in 
2009. The unexpected strong showing of the FN in the March 2010 regional elections with 
11.4 per cent nationally up to 20.3 per cent in PACA came as a distant echo of the past and a 
timely reminder of dangers inherent in playing with the devil. 
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